Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

5-11-1954

Stafford v. Shultz
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Stafford v. Shultz" (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 243.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/243

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

May 1954]

STAPFORD

v.

SHULTZ

767

l42 C.2d 767; 270 P.2d ll

[L. A. No. 22926.
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ELSAN H. S'fAFFORD, Appellant, v. ELLWOOD L.
SHULTZ et al., Respondents.
[1] Physicians-Malpractice-Pleading.--Allegations of complaint
against physicians in malpractice case that plaintiff was under
exclusive care of each defendant or group thereof for certain
specified period of time, and that defendants were at all times
practicing as physicians and surgeons in county, are sufficient
to show rPlationship of patient and physician between plaintiff
and defendants and legal duty flowing therefrom.
[2] Id.-Malpractice-Pleading.-Allegations of complaint against
physicians in malpractice case setting forth in detail negligent
acts and omissions of all defendants and stating, that as a
direct and proximate result thereof, plaintiff was injured and
suffered damage thereby, while inartistically phrased and set
forth, are sufficient to state. a cause of action against all defendants.
[3] Limitation of Actions- Commencement of Period- Tort.Cause of action against physicians for damages arising from
negligent treatment of wounded leg is barred by Code Civ.
Proc., § 340, subd. 3, .where negligent acts and omissions complained of took place more than one year prior to commencement of action.
[4] !d.-Commencement of Period-Tort.-The statute of limitations does not commence to run in cases involving fraudulent
concealment until plaintiff discovers his injury, or through use
of reasonable diligence should have discovered it.
[5a, 5b] Physicians-Malpractice- Actions- Limitations.-Fiduciary relationship of physician and patient excused plaintiff
in malpractice case from greater diligence in determining cause
of his injury, and knowledge that his leg was to be amputated
did not put him on notice that cause thereof was negligence
on part of defendants where he did not have knowledge
or notice until a later date that defendants knew or concealed
from him the seriousness of his condition.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 126; Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 160 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8, 9, 11] Physicians, §55; [3, 6]
Limitation of Actions,§ 82; [4] Limitation of Actions, § 80; [5]
Physicians, §54; [7] Limitation of Actions, § 115; [10) Pleading,
§18; [12] Notice, §2; [13, 14] Physicians, §61; [15] Parties,
§ 46(2).
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[6a, 6b] Limitation of Actions--Commencement of Period-Tort.Cause of action against
for negligent amputation of
leg is not barred by Code Civ. Proc., § :HO, subd. 3, where original complaint was filed less than one year after leg was amputated.
[7] !d.-Suspension of Statute-Concealment of Cause of Action.
-A defendant, who
fraud m· deceit <:oncenls material
facts and by misreprPsentations hinders plaintiff from bringing action within statutory period, is estopped from taking
advantage of his own wrong.
[8] Physicians- Malpractice- Pleading.-A demurrer in a malpractice case on ground that several causes of action were
united but not separately stated was not well taken where
each cause of action against each defendant or group thereof
was stated separately not only as to defendants but as to period
of time during which plaintiff was under care and treatment
of such defendant or defendants.
[9] Id.-Malpractice-Pleading.-It is not necessary for plaintiff
in a malpractice case to allege in what respect the treatment
given him might have bC'en deficient so long as allegations of
complaint charged breach of c. legal duty, proximate causation and resulting damage.
[10] Pleading-Subject Matter-Surplusage.-Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative
facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded.
[11] Physicians- Malpractice- Pleading. -Negligence may be
pleaded in general terms in malpractice cases.
[12] Notice- Constructive Notice.-Physicians' reports to State
Compensation Insurance Fund do not constitute "public
records" so as to give constructive notice as provided for by
Civ. Code, § 19.
[13] Physicians-Malpractice-AppeaL--A contention that plaintiff's complaint in a malpractice case does not state a cause of
action because a surgeon does not undertake to perform a cure
nor contract to use highest degree of care, but will use ordinary care and skill as tested by practice of responsible members of his profession in his community, is a matter of evidence
and may not be validly raised on appeal from a judgment
entered after sustaining, without leave to amend, of a demurrer to complaint.
[14] Id.- Malpractice- Appeal.-A contention that plaintiff's
allPgations in a malpractice case concerning allegedly false
representations made to him did not concern existing facts
"but were in the nature of a prophecy as to the events to
[7] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 161; Am.Jur., Limitations of Actions, § 231.
[10] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 11; Am.Jur., Pleading, §§ 51, 52.
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[15]

joindm' of
defendant has no merit on
where no
demurrer to complaint was interposed on that ground. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
.Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy and Roy L. Herndon,
Judges. Reversed .
.Action for damages for negligent treatment of bullet wound
in leg. Judgments of dismissal on sustaining general demurrers to fifth amended
reversed.
Elsan H. Stafford, in pro. per., for .Appellant.
Fulcher & Wynn, Highsmith & Allen and Bauder, Gilbert,
Thompson & Kelley for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from judgments1 of dismissal entered upon the sustaining without leave to amend
of all defendants' demurrers to his fifth amended complaint.
Plaintiff, Elsan H. Stafford, 2 in his fifth amended com1
The following matter is not raised by any of the parties but appears
from the record. On Novmnber 19, 1952, judgment of dismissal was
entered for defendants Shultz and Meier whose demurrer had been sustained without leave to amend on November 12, 1952.
On January 5, .1958, judgment of dismissal was enterefl in favor of
defendant Arthur Ferree whose demurrer had been sustained, without
leave to amend, on December S, 1952.
On January 7, 1958, judgment of dismissal was entered in favor of
defendants William Kelpien and Elizabeth Kelpien whose demurrer had
been sustained, without leave to amend, on October 31, 1.953 [sic].
On January '7, 1958 (by the same judgment as that which related to
defell<lants Kelpien) judgment of dismissal wns entered ns to defendant
John D. Gillis whose demurrer had been sustained, without leave to
amend, on October 31, 1958 [sic].
In other words, there are three separate judgments of dismissal in
this case. Plaintiff's single notice of appeal was filed on January 8,
1953 and specifically noticed an appeal from each of the three judgments.
2
Plaintiff appears in propria persona. His eomplaint is rambling and
inartistically drawn. It shows a lack of knowledge of the legal principles
involved in this type of action. I have endeavored to set forth the facts,
as he alleges them, in somewhat more logical order so as to facilitate
understanding of the principles involved. The complaint itself is set up
in two causes of action as to each defendant, or group thereof. The
allegations of the first cause concern the alleged negligent acts of the
various defendants with separate paragraphs for each defendant, or
group thereof; the second cause of action incorporates, by reference, the
allegations of the first and, in addition, contains allegations of fraudulent
representations and concealment on tl1e part of eaeh defendant, or group
thereof.

42 C.2d-25
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plaint ("For damages occasioned by Malpractice and Because
of False representations") alleges, substantially, as follows:
Statement of Facts: Plaintiff alleges that on or about
February 25, 1949, during the time when he was a deputy
sheriff of the county of Los Angeles and while acting in the
line of duty, he was wounded in the left leg by the accidental
discharge of his pistol. He states that the bullet pierced his
left leg about eight inches above the knee; that he was taken'
to the Angeles Emergency Hospital and placed under the
utre of defendants Ellwood L. Shultz, Woodrow Meier and
Arthur Ferree for treatment; that prior to that time he was
in good health and all his body members and functions were
intact and unimpaired.
l''msT CAusE o:B' AcTION AaAINS'l' DEFENDANTS SHULTZ,
MEIER, AND FERREE

Plaintiff alleges that from the time of the injury until
about March 6, 1949, he was under the care of the abovenamed defendants; that on the day of the injury, his injured
leg was X-rayed; that he did not know, but that defendants
did know, the extent of his injuries; that plaintiff is informed
and believes that after the bullet pierced his left leg, it coursed
downward and lodged on the exterior side thereof about six
inches above the ankle; that in its course, the bullet damaged
a section of the popliteal (knee area) artery about one inch
in length but did not completely sever it; that the bullet
severed the sciatic nerve. He alleges upon information and
belief that while under anaesthetic these defendants removed
the bullet, severed and removed the damaged section of the
popliteal artery and ligated (tied or bound) the severed ends
but that said defendants ''then made no effort to repair either
said damaged artery or said severed Sciatic Nerve." He
states that the care and treatment given him consisted of blood
transfusions, sedatives, penicillin injections, ice packs, and
occasional dressing of the wound and incision ; that during the
ten days these defendants treated him, the calf of his left leg
remained considerably extended "by reason of neglect of said
defendants to remove said accumulated blood.'' He alleges
that in order to effect a cure, defendants should have repaired
the artery and nerve; should have removed the accumulated
blood. He alleges that defendants had the means to obtain
knowledge as to whether or not his leg was infected whereas
he had no such knowledge or means of obtaining the same.
He then alleges that defendants neglected to take any additional X-ray pictures of his left leg.
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Plaintiff further alleges that on April 12, 1949, he was
again placed under tbe care of defendants Shultz, Meier and
l11 erree for treatment which consisted of sedatives, penicillin
injections and occasional dressing of tbe wounds; that from
April 12, 1949 until September 15, 1949, only one X-ray was
taken which was on May 5, 1949. He alleges that during this
time, considerable pus drained from the incisions; that he was
almost continually confined to his bed; that he ran a temperature and had chills and was delirious; that during this
time his health became impaired and the incisions did not
heal. He alleges that defendants should have repaired the
artery and nerve, cleansed the infection from the leg and
combated the infection of the bones which was present on
May 5, 1949, and thereafter.
SECOND CAUSE OJ<' AcTION i~GAINST DEJ<'ENDANTS SHULTZ,
MEIER, AND FERREE

Plaintiff alleges that during the three weeks these defendants treated him, they represented to him that they had
severed and ligated only one of the two arteries into which the
popliteal artery branches; that it was not then necessary to
repair or restore either the damaged artery, or the severed
sciatic nerve ''in order to effect a cure'' of the left leg; that
the accumulated blood in the injured leg would be absorbed
by natural process; that plaintiff believed said representations to be true and relied thereon.
"B1 IRST

CAUSE or<' AcTION AGAINS'r DEFENDANTS

WILLIAM KELPIEN AND ELIZABETH KELPIEN

Plaintiff alleges that about March 6, 1949, he was removed
to the Beverly Hospital in Montebello and placed under the
care of these defendants where he remained for about three
weeks; that the treatment given him by these defendants
consisted of sedatives, penicillin injections and the occasional
dressing of his wounds. He alleges that in order ''to have
insured a cure'' of his leg, these defendants should have repaired the damaged popliteal artery and sciatic nerve; should
have removed the accumulated blood from the injured leg
and should have kept the leg free from infection; that they
negleeted to take any X-ray pictures of the leg; that they
had means of obtaining the knowledge as to whether the bones
of the leg were infected whereas he had no such knowledge
or means of obtaining the same.
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SEcOND CAUSE OF AcTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS
WILLIAM KELPIEN AND ELIZABETH KELPIEN

That during the three weeks these defendants treated him,
they represented that they knew the facts of his case; that
they would effect a cure of the left leg; that it was not
necessary to
the artery which defendants Shultz,
Meier and Ferree had severed and
or to repair the
severed sciatic nerve in order to effect a cure; that the accumulated blood would be absorbed
natural process; ''that they
knew the condition of said left leg without taking X-ray pictures thereof; that the proper measures were being taken to
guard against infection of said left leg"; that plaintiff believed said representations to be true and relied thereon.
:B'rRsT CAusE oF AcTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
JoHN D. GILLIS
'l'hat about March 29, 1949, plaintiff was removed to the
Good Samaritan Hospital and placed under the care of defendant Gillis for treatment where he remained for about two
weeks; that during this time an anaesthetic was administered
to him for the purpose of making skin grafts over the incision
in the popliteal space of his left leg. He alleges on information and belief that while he was under the anaesthetic, defendant Gillis made the skin grafts and several other incisions
and drained therefrom ''fully five hundred cubic Centimeters
of old blood clots and pus matter." He alleges that when he
was discharged from the hospital on April 12, 1949, considerable pus matter was still draining from the incisions
and that he was not then cured; that to have insured a cure,
defendant should have repaired the damaged artery and the
severed nerve and should have thoroughly cleansed the leg
of all accumulated old blood clots and pus matter and "to
have taken proper measures to gu·ard against infection'' and
to "combat any infection"; that plaintiff had no way of knowing whether .infection had developed in the bones of the leg
but that defendant had the means of obtaining such information; that defendant neglected to take X-ray pictures of the
injured leg.
Plaintiff further alleges that about September 2, 1949, defendant Gillis informed him that the condition of the left leg
was seriously endangering plaintiff's general health; that
the left leg would never be of ''any material use and benefit'';
that the left leg should be amputated; that plaintiff believed
and relied on these representations and "became interested in
saving his life and lost interest in saving his le.ft leg."
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
JoHN

D.

GILLIS

Plaintiff alleges that during the time he was under this defendant's care, the defendant represented to him that it was
reasonable to expect a cure of his left
; that it was not
necessary to repair and restore the severed and
artery
in ''order to effect a cure'' ; that he knew the condition of the
leg without taking
thereof; that all the old accumulated blood and pus would adequately drain from the incisions
in the calf; that no infection was then present; that plaintiff
believed these representations to be true and relied thereon.
Plaintiff alleges that his leg was amputated by defendant
Gillis on September 22, 1949, at about midthigh; that he is
informed and believes that with the application of the proper
knowledge and skill the left leg could have been saved.
Plaintiff alleges that during all the time defendants were
caring for him, he was in no co~dition to make an investigation and had no means of discovering why his left leg was
not cured ; that the defendants led him to believe at all times
prior to September 2, 1949, that his leg would be cured.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 2, 1950. the State Compensation Insurance Fund of California served upon him
copies of reports made by certain of these defendants
(Shultz, Meier, Ferree and Gillis) which showed that the
popliteal artery, and not one of the branches, had been damaged; that the X-ray taken on May 5, 1949, disclosed that
ostitis, periostitis, ''possibly approaching the Osteomyelitis
stage'' had developed in the left leg and had infected the bones
thereof; that on September 16, 1949, the infection had spread
throughout the tibia and fibula of the left leg as far as the
knee joint and that the knee joint and lower part of the
femur were infected.
A.s to all defendants, it is alleged that plaintiff had no
information or belief as to when his leg became infected; or
as to which defendant was treating him at the time; that all
defendants contributed to his infection and neglected to
combat or cure the same ; that none of the defendants ever
consulted him concerning his case or the treatment thereof;
that all the defendants were "careless, negligent and unskillful in diagnosing plaintiff's case and in prescribing for
and treating him and his left leg; that all the defendants lacked
the necessary knowledge and skill to properly diagnose plaintiff's case and properly prescribe for and treat him and his
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left leg"; "that the acts and omissions of the defendants were
the direct and proximate cause of great and irreparable loss
and damage unto plaintiff.''
As to all defendants it is alleged that their representations
were made by them without reasonable grounds upon which
to base them and that said representations were false; that
had he known the falsity thereof, he would have required the
services of competent physicians and surgeons to care for
him; that had he known the facts disclosed by the reports, he
would have ''commenced this action for damages well within
one year of the commission by the defendants of the acts and
omissions complained of.''
All defendants demurred, either singly, or in groups, on
the grounds that no cause of action had been stated; that
several causes of action were not separately stated; that the
complaint was uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible in
specified particulars; and that plaintiff's cause of action, if
any, ·was barred by the provisions of section 340 ( 3) of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
CAusE oF AcTION
All defendants demurred to plaintiff's fifth amended complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against each of them.
In Greninger v. Fischer, 81 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [184 P.2d
694], a malpractice case, defendants' general and special demur-rers were sustained without leave to amend. The court
reversed the juclgments entered thereon. It was held there
that "It is quite obvious that these allegations set forth a legal
duty, breach thereof, proximate causation and resulting damage. That is all that is required. In this state negligence may
be pleaded in general terms, and that is as true of malpractice
cases as it is of other types of negligence cases. Moreover,
in a malpractice case, it is sufficient, at least as far as a general
demurrer is concerned, to aver that certain treatment was
negligently administered by defendant to plaintiff's damage
without alleging in what respect the treatment may have been
deficient. (Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal.2d 97
[114 P.2d 1]; Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal.2d
149 [157 P.2d 1]; Criss v. Angelns Hospital Assn., 13 Cal.
App.2d 412 [56 P.2d 1274] ; Abos v. Martyn, 31 Cal.App.2d
705 [88 P.2d 797] ; Smith v. Beancharnp, 71 Cal.App.2d 250
[162 P.2d 662] ; see notes 33 Cal.L.Rev. 248, 264; 35 CaLL
Rev. 267, 269.)"
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[1] Plaintiff here has alleged that he was under the exclusive care of each defendant, or group thereof, for certain
specified periods of time; that these defendants were at all
times practicing as physicians and surgeons in the county of
Los Angeles. These allegations are sufficient to show the relationship of patient and physician between plaintiff and
defendants and the legal duty flowing therefrom. [2] Plaintiff alleged in detail the negligent acts and omissions of all defendants and that as a direct and proximate result thereof,
he was injured and suffered damage thereby. \Vhile inartistically phrased and set forth, it appears clearly that the
allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of
action (without reference to the statute of limitations) against
all defendants. As is hereinafter set forth, plaintiff's second
cause of action, which incorporated the allegations of the first,
was also sufficient in alleging facts adequate to toll the statute
of limitations.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

All defendants demurred to plaintiff's complaint on the
ground that it was barred by the provisions of section~340, subdivision 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. In H~tysman v.
Kirsch, 6 Cal.2d 302, 306 [57 P.2d 908], we held that an action
by a patient against a physician for injuries sustained by the
former, by reason of the negligent or unskilled treatment of
the latter, is an action sounding in tort and not upon a contract. Such an action is therefore barred by the provisions
of subdivision 3 of section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure one year after the date of the injury. [3] It is apparent from the allegations in plaintiff's complaint so far as
his first cause of action is concerned, that the negligent acts
and omissions complained of took place more than one year
prior to the commencement of the action with the filing of the
original complaint on September 12, 1.950. 'fhe demurrers,
with the exception of that of defendant Gillis were, without
more appearing, well taken to the first cause of action.
In the second cause of action, however, plaintiff alleges
that defendants made certain misrepresentations to him concerning the treatment necessary to "effect a cure" of his
leg; that they misrepresented the extent of his injnr.v; that
they neglected to repair the injured artery and nerve and
represented to him that sueh I'epair was not npeessary to ''effect
a cure"; that they represented to him that they knew the
condition of his leg without taking X-ray pictures; that all
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of these representations were made without reasonable grounds
upon which to base them; that the representations were false
and that had he known the falsity thereof, he would have required the services of
physicians to care for him
and, further, would have
his action well within the
one-year
As heretofore noted, plaintiff is appearing
in propria persona and his
is most awkwardly
it appears that he is
drawn. From the allegations
charging all defendants with negligent treatment and care
and with the failure to make a correct diagnosis by reason of
a failure to take X-ray pictures of his leg as well as with a
fraudulent concealment from him of his true condition while
assuring him that they knew the condition of his leg without
taking X-ray pictures thereof; that he is charging all defendants with falsely representing to him that it was reasonable to expect a cure of his leg.
Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, as we are
bound for the purpose of this appeal to do, it would appear
that plaintiff's leg was amputated on September 22, 1949 and
that he first lmev,r of the necessity therefor on September 2,
1949. He further alleges, however, that defendants Shultz,
Meier and Ferree had made reports to the State Insurance
Compensation Fund, based on X-rays taken by them on May 5,
1949, which disclosed that "Ostitis, Periostitis, possibly approaching the Osteomyelitis stage, had developed in said left
leg and infected the bones thereof"; and that "on or about
August 2. 1950, the State Compensation Insurance Fund of
California, served copies on plaintiff of [these] reports made
by certain defendants of plaintiff's case. That plaintiff had no
reason to believe and did not know said reports had been made
or existed, before said time.'' The essence of these allegations
is that while plaintiff knew his leg would have to be amputated
and that it was later amputated, he did not know that the
amputation was necessary because of the negligent care given
him by the defendants until on August 2, 1950, he received
the reports made by them.
[4] The rule has been stated (Pellett v. Sonotone Corp.,
55 Cal.App.2d 158, 160 [130 P.2d 181]) that the statute of
limitations does not commence to run until the plaintiff discovered his injury, or through the use of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered it (Bowman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal.
App.2d 795, 798 [176 P.2d 745]; Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d
131, 147 [163 P.2d 443]). We must then determine whether
the knowledge received by plaintiff on September 2, 1949, that
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hlm on notice that defendants
his leg must be
in the treatment and care therehad been
82 CaLApp.2d 176, 182
of. (See also
[185 P.2d 851] Faith v.
52 Cal.App.2d 228, 230
[126 P.2d 151] ; Petrucci v.
43 Cal.App.2d 561,
562 [111 P.2d
; M(J;rsh v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 217
Cal. 338 [18 P.2d 933].)
In Bowman v.
77 Oal.App.2d 795, 800 [176
P.2d 745], the court said: "Perhaps the most significant
feature in the
case which makes inapplicable the
doctrine of constructive notice is the existence of the relationship between the parties of physician and patient, which in
contemplation of law is a
one. (20 Cal.Jur., p. 1072,
§ 20.) As fiduciaries it was the duty of defendants to make
a full and fair disclosure to plaintiff of all facts which materially affected his
and interests. This principle has
been applied and expressed in one form or another in several
recent decisions
specifically with the question of
fraudulent concealment of a cause of action in its relation to
the statute of limitation. (Hansen v. Bear Film Co., Inc., 28
Cal.2d 154, 178-179 [168 P.2d 946]; Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d
131, 148 [163 P.2d 443]; BoUinger v. National Fire Ins. Co.,
25 Cal.2d 399, 411 [154 P.2d 399] ; Pashley v. Pacific Elec.
Ry. Co., supra [25 OaL2d 226 (153 P.2d 325)], at page 235.)"
In Hobart v. Hobart Estate
26 Oal.2d 412, 440 [159
P.2d 958], it was said that it was
in cases involving
a fiduciary relationship that "facts which would ordinarily
require investigation may not excite suspicion, and that the
same degree of diligence is not required'' of the injured
person. (See also Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal.2d
479, 486 [80 P.2d 978, 117 A.L.R. 383]; Bainbridge v. Stoner,
16 Cal.2d 423, 430 [106 P.2d 423] .) In Pashley v. Pacific
Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal.2d 226, 235 (153 P.2d 325], we said:
''As determined in those cases, the confidence growing out of
the relationship of doctor and
imposed upon the
physician the
of refraining from fraudulent concealment, that is, the duty of disclosure when he had knowledge
of the facts. . . . Where there is a duty to disclose, the disclosure must be full and
and any material concealment or misrepresentation will amount to fraud sufficient to
entitle the party
to an action. (Kimball v.
Pacific' Gas & Elec. Co., supra, at p. 219 [220 Cal. 203 (30
P.2d 39)]; Vance v. Suprerne Lodge, su,pra [15 Cal.App. 178
(114 P. 83)] .) Since its voluntary undertaking placed upon
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the defendant the duty to disclose to the plaintiff the full
extent of his injuries and the probable future disability to
be expected therefrom, its false representation designed to
conceal facts lmovvn to it and intended to prevent plaintiff's
consulting· other physicians and thus hinder him from bringing action until after the running of the statutory period of
limitations, must be deemed to amount to fraud upon the
plaintiff and to excuse any greater diligence on his part under
the facts disclosed by the complaint. No fact as to the plaintiff's condition is alleged which could be deemed to have put
him on earlier notice.''
[5a] It would appear from the foregoing, that the fiduciary
relationship of physician and patient excused plaintiff from
greater diligence in determining the cause of his injury and
that he was not, therefore, put on notice by the knowledge
received by him on September 2, 1949 that his leg was to be
amputated, that the cause thereof was negligence on the part
of these defendants.
In Kimball v. Pacific Gas &; Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 203, 210
[30 P.2d 39], this court said: "vVe are of the opinion, however, that independent of statute, a fraudulent concealment
by the defendant of the facts upon which a legal common-law
action is based, under the proper circumstances, tolls the
statute until discovery and that upon discovery the statute
applicable to that particular action (in this case sec. 340,
subd. 3, of Code Civ. Proc.) then commences to run." And
held (p. 215) : "vVe, therefore, hold that the better view and
the one supported by the cases in this state and by the
\creight of authority elsewhere is that as far as a legal action
for personal injuries is concerned, the fraudulent concealment by the defendant of the facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action depends tolls the statute, and such
statute does not begin to run until the discovery by plaintiff
or until by reasonable diligence the plaintiff should have discovered the facts." It was held there that even though plaintiff pleaded fraud and concealment to toll the statute, the
same rules should apply as if section 338, subdivision 4. of
the Code of Civil Procedure 3 were relied upon. The court,
quoting from Original Min. & Mill Co. v. Casad, 210 Cal.
71, 75 [290 P. 456], said: "It will be discovered upon an
3
The cause
' 'An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake.
of action in such case not to be deemed to have aecmod until the
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistnke." (Code Civ. Proc., ~ 3il8, suhd. 4.)
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analysis of the above cases that there are three major allegations that must be contained in the complaint before it will
be held sufficient: 1. The complaint must allege when the fraud
was discovered; 2. The circumstances under which it was diseovered and, 3. Pacts must be alleged to show that plail;ltiff
is not at fault for failing to discover the fraud sooner, and
that the plaintiff has no actual or presumptive knowledge of
facts sufficient to put him on inquiry.''
Plaintiff alleged that on August 2, 1950, he discovered
that defendants Shultz, Meier and Ferree had knowledge of
the seriousness of his condition, through reports theretofore
made by them to the State Compensation Insurance Fund.
As we have heretofore seen, the confidential relationship existing between a patient and his physician or physicians would
excuse plaintiff from any greater diligence on his part. It
would appear, therefore, that plaintiff's second cause of action
alleges sufficient facts to toll the statute of limitations.
As to defendant Gillis, plaintiff alleges that his leg was
amputated by this defendant on September 22, 1949, and that
"plaintiff is now informed and believes and placing his allegations on that ground alleges that with the application of the
proper knowledge and skill said left leg could still been [sic]
saved and have been of use and benefit to plaintiff." While,
again, the phraseology of the allegations leaves much to be
desired, it is apparent that the gravamen of the complaint
against defendant Gillis is that the amputation could have
been avoided by proper, skillful care and treatment. A further allegation charges that as a "direct and proximate re>mlt" of the "careless, neglignece [sic] and unskillful acts
. . . [and] omissions . . . " of all defendants, plaintiff suffered the amputation of his leg, etc. [6a] It is also apparent
that this first cause of action against defendant Gillis is not
barred by the statute of limitation inasmuch as plaintiff's
original complaint was filed on September 12, 1950. [7] Defendant Gillis is also charged with fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment and from what has been heretofore
said, it appears that defendant Gillis is estopped from taking
advantage of the statute of limitation. We said in Pashley
v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., supra, 25 Cal.2d 226, 231, "In reality
the ground of relief is that the defendant, having by fraud
or deceit concealed material facts and by misrepresentations
hindered the plaintiff from bringing an action within the
statutory period, is estopped from taking advantage of his
own wrong."
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There is an additional reason
the demurrers as to the
second cause of action were not well taken. Plaintiff alleged
that his leg was
1949.
If,
as has been said
Gas & Elec.
p. 214) : " . . . the rule is well settled that in a
ease the statute starts to run from the date
the
within the

If he is deemed to have
of these defendants at the time his
his action vms eommenced in time.
that he should not be deemed to have
or notice, until he received the
fendants
Meier and :B'erree
until that time he did not have
defendants knew, and concealed
his eondition.
DEMURRER O:!<' DEJ;'ENDAN'l'S SHUL'rz AND MEIER

[8] These defendants also demurred on the ground that
several causes of action were united but not separately stated.
Plaintiff's complaint as heretofore
sets forth in numbered, separate
the
as to each defendant, or group
and consists of two causes·of action
as to each defendant, or group
It has been pointed
out that the allegations of the first cause of action are sufficient
to state a cause of action for
and those of the
second to toll the statute of limitations. This ground of demurrer is not well taken. Each cause of action against each
defendant or group thereof is stated
not only as to
defendants but as to the
of time
which plaintiff was under the care aud treatment of such defendant, or
defendants. If the demurrer was meant to be on the ground
that causes of action
tlwFle defendants were improperly
joined, that contention is answered
to defendants
by reason of the rule set forth in
v. Smith, 24 Cal.2d
124, 129, 130 [148 P.2d
We said
there : ''Although the
before us is far from being a
model of clarity, concisenee;s, or consistency, it does fairly
appear therefrom that
Wanda Kraft sustained certain severe physical
that the defendants were severally and successively
to treat such injuries, that
each defendant was
in the treatment he administered,
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result of the negligence of one or the
defendants the plaintiff Wanda Kraft
neither defendant
caused
the independent tort of his
himself did not proximately conthat neither defendant
will have been
was
occasioned
their
in the one action. If it develops
that only one defendant was
in his treatment the
assessment of the verdict will be
If, on the other
hand, it appears that
of both defendants contributed
to cause an injury for which plaintiff
is entitled to recover, it may be a matter entailing great difficulty of
as to the mnount in which each defendant is
responsible.'' And: ''The facts that defendants are not joint
tort feasors but
and that their negligence
rather than concurrently in time
to produce the
are not vetitive of the right of joinder.
The salutary procedure afforded by sections 379a, 379b and
379c of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly intended to be
available upon a
either that the negligence of two or
more persons, whether joint, independently concurrent, or
successive, contributed proximately to cause the injury for
which recovery is
or that the injury for which recovery is
was proximately caused by the negligence of
one or another or several of two or more persons and, as to
each person who is not charged absolutely, that a reasonable
uncertainty, requiring determination of some factual or legal
issue, exists in respect to alternative or quantitative liability.''
(Pp. 130, 131.)
It appears then that this ground of demurrer was not well
taken and should not have been sustained.
These defendants also demurred upon the ground that the
complaint was
unintelligible and ambiguous in
that it could not be ascertained whether the negligence on their
part consisted of a failure to
the leg free from infection
or negligence in
for and treating the leg; and that
it cannot be ascertained whether
are charged with negligence in
to
the
and nerve and in failing
to remove accumulated blood and, if so, whether plaintiff is
charging that any
resulted; and that it cannot be
ascertained what acts defendants are charged with failure to
perform in order to have properly combated an infection.
and that as a
other or both
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The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendants
neglected properly to care for his leg as a result of which
the leg was amputated, to his damage and loss. [9] As was
said in Greninger v. Fischer, supra, 81 Cal.App.2c1 549, 552,
it was not necessary for plaintiff to allege in what respect the
treatment given him might have been deficient so long as the
allegations of the complaint charged the breach of a legal
duty, proximate causation and resulting damage.
[10] Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the
claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may
be stricken out or disregarded. (21 Cal.Jur., p. 24, § 11;
Brea v. McGlashan, 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 460 [39 P.2d 877] ;
Kidwell v. General Petrolet~m Corp., 212 Cal. 720, 723 [300
P. 1, 76 A.I.~.R. 830] ; M~orlock v. Fink, 81 Cal.App. 686,
690 [254 P. 578] .)
It follows, therefore, that the demurrer of defendants
Shultz and Meier should have been overruled.
DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT FERREE

In addition to the grounds of demurrer heretofore set forth
on which all defendants demurred and which have been dismissed, defendant Arthur Ferree demurred on the ground that
plaintiff's first cause of action was uncertain, ambiguous and
unintelligible because it could not be ascertained "how or
in what manner it is contended that this demurring defendant
was careless, negligent and unskillful" so far as the treatment of plaintiff was concerned. As heretofore noted, it was
unnecessary for plaintiff to allege in detail the facts on which
the alleged negligence of the defendant rested. [11] Negligence may be pleaded in general terms in malpractice cases
as well as in other types of negligence (Greninger v. Fischer,
st~pra, 81 Cal.App.2d 549, 552.)
CONTENTIONS OF DEJ<'ENDANTS

[12] All defendants contend that plaintiff was put on
notice of the extent of his injury because the proceeding:s
under the Workmen's Compensation Act were "public
record [s]. The plaintiff, was, therefore, put on inquiry as
to everything that it disclosed and, therefore, cannot hide behind his indolence in failing to pursue that which he was
bound to inquire about and thus base his claim to an extension of the statute." All defendants rely upon Crabbe v.
White, 113 Cal.App.2d 356 [248 P.2d 193], Sonbergh v. MacQuarrie, 112 Cal.App.2d 771 [247 P.2d 133] and Huysman v.
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Hirsch, 6 Cal.2d 302 [57 P.2d 908], in support of this contention. Crabbe v. White, supra, involved a will which had
been filed for probate and the court held that a will, when
filed, became a matter of public record and that means of
knowledge, especially where it consisted of public records,
vvas deemed in law to be knowledge. Sonbergh v. JJfacQuarrie,
snpra, is not in point. The court there held that a complaint
not filed until two years and ten months after the alleged
assault was not filed in time in the absence of any allegation
of fraud, concealment or- dtwess on the part of defendant
which would have prevented the plaintiff fr-mn ascertaining
earlier- that he had suffered inJury at the hands of the defendant. Hnysman v. Ki1·sch, sttpra, holds, as heretofore set
forth, that the statute of limitations should not run against
a plaintiff's cause of action until that plaintiff had knowledge
thereof, or should, in the exercise of due care and diligence,
have acquired knowledge thereof. No authority has been
cited, nor can any be found, which provides that physicians'
reports to the State Compensation Insurance Fund of California shall constitute "public records" so as to give constructive notice as provided for by section 19 of the Civil Code
("Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular
fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in
whieh, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned
such fact.") It would appear, therefore, that there is no
merit to this contention of defendants.
[13] All defendants, with the exceptiou of Dr. Ferree,
contend that plaintiff's complaint does not state a cause of
aetion because "[I]t is fundamental that a surgeon does not
undertake to perform a cure, nor does he contract to use
the highest degree of care, but will use ordinary care and
skill as tested by the practice of responsible members of his
profession in his community." This, it would appear, is a
matter of evidence and not a valid contention upon an appeal
from a judgment entered after the sustaining, without leave
i·o amend, of a demurrer to a complaint. As we said in
Huysman Y. Kirsch, supra, 6 Ca1.2d 302, 313: "However,
statements of counsel in their briefs relative to the evidence
which may be produced at the trial have no bearing upon the
question of the sufficiency of a complaint, and cannot be considered by the eourt in passing upon that question. (Stone
v. hnperial Water Co., 173 Cal. 39, 43 [159 P. 164].)"
[14] Defendant Feree contends that plaintiff's allega-
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tions concerning the
false
made to
him did not concern
facts "but were in the nature of
a prophecy as to the events to
in the future." It is
argued that the question, in such a case, is whether the belief
was actually and
entertained
those
the
representations.
'Nonld appear to be a matter of evidence (II~~ysman v.
a valid objection
to the sufficiency of
said that this contention has even
fact that a
cures.
Rasmussen v.
P.2d 184], cited
in support of this contention involved the granting of a
and the com·t was concerned with the
motion for a
evidence produced by the
[15] Defendants'
of parties
defendant found in their briefs has no merit in view of the
fact that no demurrer was interposed on that ground (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430) and in view of the discussion heretofore
set forth.
For the foregoing reasons tbe judgments are and each of
them is reversed.
Traynor, J., Spence, .J., and Bray, J. pro tem.,* concurred.
Edmonds, .J., concurred in the judgment.

*Assigned by Chairman of J udlcial Council.

